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Crafting an Asbestos Scheduled Compensation 
Solution for Louisiana and the Nation 
INTRODUCTION 
“Have you been exposed to asbestos?” On a regular basis, our 
television poses this question. Before we have time to formulate an 
answer, we know that a website filled with information along with 
a 1-800 hotline waits at the end of the commercial. Often, we shrug 
these advertisements off as mere annoyances and assure ourselves 
that somewhere, a lawyer is banking on a legal get-rich-quick 
scheme. After the advertisement concludes, we ponder why 
asbestos claims still exist, because asbestos’ health effects have not 
plagued recent generations. 
We fail to recognize, however, that these commercials are 
merely the public façade of a problem facing courts across the 
country. Asbestos not only affects those with one of its associated 
health problems, but also all citizens, because society must bear the 
substantial costs of litigating the claims of those injured by 
asbestos. The cost of asbestos litigation has caused an amount of 
medical and economic suffering never experienced under 
American tort law.
1
 Asbestos litigation has left plaintiffs without 
compensation, corporations without assets, courts with crowded 
dockets, and litigators with hearty bank accounts. 
Unfortunately, the solutions offered by state governments and 
the federal government to reform asbestos litigation have been 
ineffective.
2
 Recently, Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc. forced the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to choose a solution for Louisiana’s 
asbestos litigation crisis.
3
 Due to judicial constraints, however, the 
court was unable to consider the myriad of other solutions 
available in other states.
4
 Therefore, the court’s decision not only 
failed to advance any solution to the asbestos litigation problem 
but also worsened it. 
The inability of the Louisiana Supreme Court to craft a proper 
solution for Louisiana’s asbestos litigation problem requires 
legislative action. This Comment seeks to remedy the asbestos 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2012, by BRITTAN J. BUSH. 
 1. See discussion infra Part I (discussing the history of the asbestos litigation 
crisis). 
 2. See discussion infra Part II (discussing the pros and cons of consolidation 
and medical criteria statutes as a solution to the asbestos litigation crisis). 
 3. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065 (La. 2009). 
 4. See discussion infra Part II (explaining the use of asbestos case 
consolidation and medical criteria statutes as solutions to the asbestos litigation 
crisis). 
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litigation crisis by formulating a state-administered scheduled 
compensation model that balances the interests of asbestos 
plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys. Part I lays out the history of 
asbestos and its accompanying litigation and explains the 
jurisprudence behind Louisiana’s asbestos litigation crisis. Part II 
examines the pros and cons of the solutions offered by other state 
legislatures to combat the asbestos litigation problem. Part III 
analyzes why a state-administered compensation schedule that 
incorporates provisions from the 2006 Fairness in Asbestos Injury 
Resolution Act and the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act fairly 
balances the interests of asbestos plaintiffs, defendants, and 
attorneys.
5
 Part V concludes by arguing that the Louisiana 
Legislature, as well as other state legislatures, should enact a 
scheduled compensation plan for asbestos injuries. 
I. THE ASBESTOS PROBLEM 
The asbestos problem began when asbestos transformed from a 
miracle fiber into an occupational hazard that ravaged society. 
Asbestos litigation costs negatively affect not only asbestos 
plaintiffs but also defendants and the judicial system. In Louisiana, 
courts split on whether to adjudicate asbestos claims in the 
workers’ compensation or tort system. The Louisiana Supreme 
Court recently resolved this split and sent Louisiana courts down a 
path of increased asbestos litigation costs for plaintiffs, defendants, 
and the State. 
A. The Miracle Fiber 
Asbestos is a group of six different naturally occurring fibrous 
minerals.
6
 Chrysotile, also known as white asbestos, was the 
primary form of commercial asbestos throughout the United States 
until the Environmental Protection Agency largely banned the use 
of asbestos in 1989.
7
 Like other forms of asbestos, chrysotile does 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th 
Cong. (2006); LA. REV. STAT. § 40:1299.41 (2010); see also discussion infra Part 
III (explaining how a state administered compensation scheduled incorporating 
provisions from the FAIR Act and the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act presents 
a solution for Louisiana’s asbestos litigation crisis). 
 6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE 
FOR ASBESTOS (2001) (noting the six different types of asbestos: amosite, 
chrysotile, crocidolite, tremolite, actinolite, and anthophyllite). 
 7. Id. (noting that although chrysotile was the primary form of commercial 
asbestos, amosite and crocidolite were also widely used); 40 C.F.R. § 763.160–
.179 (2011) (largely banning the commercial use of asbestos in the United States). 
2012] COMMENT 759 
 
 
 
not evaporate or dissolve in water and is resistant to thermal, 
chemical, and biological degradation.
8
 The durability of asbestos 
led to its incorporation in a variety of manufactured products, 
building materials, friction products, and heat resistant fabrics.
9
 
With all of its positive characteristics, asbestos became known as 
“the miracle fiber.”10 
The miracle fiber became an occupational nightmare for tort 
law systems throughout the United States. In the early twentieth 
century, medical professionals began to recognize fibrosis in the 
lungs of factory workers.
11
 The common link between victims of 
the disease was exposure to asbestos within factories.
12
 In 1930, 
medical professionals discovered that inhaled asbestos fibers 
settled between the air cells of the lungs and caused scar tissue to 
develop.
13
 This condition became known as asbestosis and was 
recognized as an occupational hazard for those working with 
asbestos.
14
 Asbestosis results in breathing difficulties, fatigue, and, 
in serious cases, right ventricle failure.
15
 
The medical problems associated with asbestos did not end 
with asbestosis. Factory workers exposed to asbestos soon 
exhibited signs of lung cancer.
16
 In the 1940s, British and 
American doctors began seriously examining the link between 
asbestosis and lung cancer.
17
 Their studies revealed three major 
findings: (1) the large number of cases involving asbestos workers 
with lung cancer originating in the lower lobes of the lungs, (2) the 
latency period between exposure to asbestos and the development 
of cancer, and (3) the large number of asbestosis victims also 
suffering from lung cancer upon autopsy.
18
 The findings comprised 
the earliest epidemiological support for the link between asbestos 
                                                                                                             
 8. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, TOXICOLOGICAL PROFILE 
FOR ASBESTOS (2001). 
 9. Id. 
 10. MARYLAND DEP’T OF THE ENV’T, FACT SHEET ON ASBESTOS (2010), 
available at http://www.mde.state.md.us/Programs/Air/FactsaboutAsbestos/Pages/ 
index.aspx. 
 11. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL & LEGAL ASPECTS 7 (2d. ed. 
1986). 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 10–11. 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 470 (Merck Research 
Laboratories, 18th ed. 2006) [hereinafter MERCK]. 
 16. CASTLEMAN, supra note 11, at 40.  
 17. Id. at 39. 
 18. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL & LEGAL ASPECTS 113 (3d. 
ed. 1990). 
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and cancer.
19
 It was not until the mid-1950s, however, that any 
consensus regarding the carcinogenic properties of asbestos was 
established.
20
  
Asbestos’ most sinister health effect is mesothelioma, an 
incurable malignant cancer.
21
 The most common form of the 
disease is pleural mesothelioma, and it accounts for 90% of 
mesothelioma diagnoses.
22
 Pleural mesothelioma results in pleural 
thickening that encases a victim’s lungs.23 Pleural thickening 
causes chest pain, weight loss, fluid buildup in the abdomen, blood 
clotting, anemia, and bowel obstruction.
24
 Workers exposed to 
asbestos have a 10% chance of developing mesothelioma, and its 
average latency period is 30 to 50 years.
25
 Upon diagnosis, 
mesothelioma is a virtual death sentence with an average survival 
time of 8 to 15 months.
26
 The primary care given to its victims is 
simply to relieve pain and suffering.
27
 
Asbestos’ deadly health problems created the largest mass 
personal injury tort in history.
28
 Asbestos litigation will eventually 
cost nearly $265 billion,
29
 which surpasses the litigation costs for 
tobacco and Agent Orange.
30
 Of the $70 billion spent on asbestos 
litigation since the first asbestos lawsuit, plaintiffs recovered $29 
billion compared to legal counsels’ $41 billion benefit.31 When 
compared to the $13 billion collected by litigators in tobacco’s 
$246 billion litigation, the disparity between asbestos litigation 
costs and other mass torts is startling.
32
 This disparity signals an 
inherent problem in the judicial system’s adjudication of asbestos 
claims. 
                                                                                                             
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 144. 
 21. MERCK, supra note 15, at 471. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. Pleural thickening affects the membrane covering the pleural cavity 
which protects human lungs. 
 24. NAT’L CANCER INST., ASBESTOS EXPOSURE AND CANCER RISK (2009), 
available at http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Risk/asbestos. 
 25. MERCK, supra note 15, at 471. 
 26. Id. at 472. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS & 
COMPENSATION (2004); Michelle J. White, Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts, 
18 J. ECON. PERSP. 183 (2004). 
 29. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 28, at vii. 
 30. White, supra note 28, at 192 (noting the total costs of Agent Orange 
litigation ($180 million) and tobacco litigation ($246 billion)). 
 31. Id. at 195 (outlining the distribution of asbestos litigation costs among 
plaintiffs ($29 billion), their attorneys ($20 billion), and defense counsel ($21 
billion)). 
 32. Id. at 192. 
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The large number of asbestos defendants causes the disparity 
between the costs of asbestos litigation and other mass torts. 
Asbestos litigation has involved an unprecedented number of 
defendants. Plaintiffs have filed more than 730,000 suits against 
more than 8,400 defendants.
33
 There are 400 times more asbestos 
defendants than the combined number of defendants in the 
litigation over Agent Orange, Dalkon Shield, breast implants, Fen 
Phen, and tobacco.
34
  
Asbestos litigation costs have taken a toll on major asbestos 
manufacturers and their customers. In the 1980s, companies facing 
massive asbestos liability began filing for bankruptcy in droves 
because of rising litigation costs from asbestos claims.
35
 As of 
2007, seventy-eight companies had filed for bankruptcy protection 
due to asbestos litigation costs.
36
 Bankruptcy protection, however, 
is utilized not only by major asbestos manufacturers but also 
nontraditional asbestos defendants with primary business interests 
in shipbuilding, flooring, and automotive part manufacturing.
37
 
Most asbestos bankruptcies establish a bankruptcy trust to 
                                                                                                             
 33. Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Innovations and 
Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (2006). For a further discussion of the 
rise in asbestos claims see CARROLL ET. AL, supra note 28, at 22–30. 
 34. See White, supra note 28, at 192 (comparing the differences in plaintiff, 
defendant, and attorney compensation statistics between asbestos, Agent Orange, 
Dalkon Shield, breast implant, Fen-Phen, tobacco, lead, firearm, and fast-food 
litigation). 
 35. Mark D. Plevin et al., Where Are They Now, Part Four: A Continuing 
History of the Companies that have Sought Bankruptcy Protection Due to 
Asbestos Claims, MEALEY’S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 8 (Feb. 2007) [hereinafter 
Plevin, Where Are They Now?] (showing companies filing for bankruptcy 
protection due to asbestos litigation costs as of February 2007). For a further 
discussion of bankruptcies associated with asbestos see Eric D. Green et al., 
Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Down But Not Out, 63 N.Y.U ANN. SURV. 
AM. LAW. 727 (2008); Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass Torts in the 
Bankruptcy System, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1613 (2008); Mark D. Plevin et al., 
Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 883 
(2003) [hereinafter Plevin, Pre-Packaged]. 
 36. Plevin, Where are They Now?, supra note 35. 
 37. Id. I use the term “traditional asbestos defendants” to describe companies 
with a primary business interest in incorporating asbestos into products and 
asbestos mining. Johns-Manville, Philadelphia Asbestos Corp, and Lake Asbestos 
of Quebec, Ltd. are examples of traditional asbestos defendants. The term 
“nontraditional asbestos defendants” is used to describe companies who used 
products containing asbestos in their normal course of business. Nontraditional 
asbestos defendants do not actively incorporate asbestos into a product. The term 
includes companies with a primary business outside of asbestos mining and 
incorporation. 
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compensate asbestos claims.
38
 Unfortunately, asbestos bankruptcy 
trusts are often quickly depleted and fail to compensate plaintiffs 
properly.
39
 
Mass asbestos bankruptcies hinder a plaintiff’s ability to seek 
recovery against a single traditional asbestos defendant.
40
 
Therefore, plaintiffs are now suing dozens of nontraditional 
asbestos defendants to garner the recovery they normally would 
have received from a single traditional defendant.
41
 Often, 
nontraditional defendants have exposed their plaintiffs to asbestos 
only in extremely small quantities.
42
 The nontraditional defendant 
phenomenon increased the number of defendants in asbestos 
litigation and poses difficult causation and damage allocation 
determinations for the courts.
43
  
Asbestos was once the miracle fiber. But, the mix of asbestos 
exposure to more than 27 million individuals, asbestos’ dire health 
effects, and rising litigation costs destroyed asbestos’ miraculous 
appeal.
44
 Plaintiffs now face a litigation scheme where 
compensation is only available by suing dozens of defendants, and 
defendants must sacrifice their own economic well-being to litigate 
asbestos claims. What was once the miracle fiber is now nothing 
more than a nightmare. 
B. The Louisiana Problem 
Until recently, Louisiana possessed a unique problem in 
modern day asbestos litigation. Throughout the state, the Louisiana 
circuit courts of appeal waged judicial warfare over the 
applicability of the 1952 Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act’s 
Occupational Disease Amendment (the Amendment) to individuals 
affected by mesothelioma.
45
 At the time, the circuit courts were 
                                                                                                             
 38. See Plevin, Pre-Packaged, supra note 35, at 888 (noting that asbestos 
bankruptcies are often filed under an expedited bankruptcy procedure under 
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and establish a bankruptcy trust to 
compensate future asbestos claims). 
 39. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited 
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L. J. 1879, 1895 n.42 (1991) 
(describing the rapid depletion of the Johns Manville asbestos bankruptcy trust 
after only 25,000 of more than 140,000 claims were adjudicated).  
 40. See White, supra note 33, at 369. 
 41. Id. 
 42. STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxix (2005). 
 43. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the need for plaintiffs to utilize 
nontraditional tort theories to prove causation of an asbestos injury in the tort 
system). 
 44. CARROLL ET AL., supra note 42, at 19; White, supra note 33, at 365.  
 45. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1 (1952). 
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split on whether recovery for mesothelioma damages was 
exclusively under the Amendment or Louisiana tort law.
46
 
In 1952, the Louisiana legislature adopted the Occupational 
Disease Amendment to the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation 
Act.
47
 The Amendment responded to the extension of workers’ 
compensation coverage across the country at the time.
48
 Initially, 
the Amendment was a general coverage statute providing recovery 
for all occupational diseases under Louisiana’s workers’ 
compensation system.
49
 The legislature modified the Amendment, 
however, and adopted a scheduled workers’ compensation statute 
covering only diseases enumerated under the statute.
50
 In 1975, the 
Louisiana legislature changed the Amendment and enacted a 
general coverage statute.
51
 
The Amendment provided coverage for poisoning or diseases 
resulting from contact with 16 classifications of elemental 
compounds.
52
 It also provided coverage for specific diseases such 
as asbestosis, silicosis, dermatosis, and pneumoconiosis.
53
 Prior to 
the Amendment’s enactment, occupational disease victims sought 
recovery against their employers in tort.
54
 The Amendment’s 
exclusivity clause, however, barred any action in tort against one’s 
employer for occupational diseases covered in the Amendment.
55
 
Therefore, employees under the Amendment were unable to seek a 
remedy in Louisiana tort law for asbestosis, silicosis, dermatosis, 
                                                                                                             
 46. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1071 (La. 2009) (noting 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision to grant writs to resolve the split among 
the Louisiana circuit courts of appeal regarding mesothelioma coverage under the 
Amendment). Compare Johnson v. Ashland Oil Co., 684 So. 2d 1156 (La.  Ct. 
App. 1st 1996); Gautreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 694 So. 2d 977, 979 (La. Ct. App. 
4th 1996) (noting the exclusion of asbestos injuries other than asbestos under the 
Amendment), with Adams v. Asbestos Corp. Ltd., 914 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (La. Ct. 
App. 2d 2005); Brunet v. Avondale Indus., 772 So. 2d 974, 984 (La. Ct. App. 5th 
2005), reh’g denied, 2000 La. App. LEXIS 3470 (2000) (noting the Second and 
Fifth Circuit’s inclusion of asbestos injuries other than asbestosis under the 
Amendment). 
 47. WEX S. MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION LAW & 
PRACTICE § 218 (Supp. 1964) (noting the practice in other states of extending 
worker’s compensation coverage). 
 48. Id. 
 49. H. B. 1098, 1952 Leg., 19th Reg. Sess. (La. 1952). 
 50. MALONE, supra note 47, § 218 (explaining the Louisiana legislature’s 
decision to enact a scheduled worker’s compensation statute). 
 51. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1 (1975). 
 52. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1(A)(1)(a) (1952). 
 53. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1(A)(2–6) (1952). 
 54. MALONE, supra note 47, § 218 (explaining the general practice of 
employees seeking recovery for occupational diseases against their employers 
under the tort system). 
 55. LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1031.1(F) (1952). 
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and pneumoconiosis. In addition, the Amendment barred suits for 
diseases and poisoning caused by substances within the 16 
elemental-compound classifications.
56
 
The Louisiana circuit courts of appeal split over the 
interpretation of the Amendment’s coverage and exclusivity 
clauses. For years, Louisiana courts held that the Amendment 
covered diseases not specifically enumerated in the statute. Some 
of the non-enumerated diseases held to be within the Amendment’s 
parameters included bullous emphysema caused by spray paint 
exposure, pneumoconiosis, pneumonitis from a chemical spray, 
lung injuries from spray-on detergent and sandblasting, and 
trinitrotoluene (TNT) toxemia from TNT dust.
57
 
The circuit courts also explicitly addressed asbestos injury 
coverage under the Amendment. The first circuit in Johnson v. 
Ashland Oil Co. held mesothelioma was not compensable under 
the Amendment.
58
 Because mesothelioma was not listed as a 
covered disease, and asbestos was not specifically listed as a toxic 
substance under the Amendment, the Johnson court reasoned that 
the only remedy for asbestos injuries other than asbestosis was in 
tort.
59
 
In Gautreaux v. Rheem Manufacturing Co., a two-judge 
plurality on a five-judge panel in the fourth circuit held lung cancer 
caused by asbestos was not compensable under the Amendment.
60
 
Although the plurality reasoned that lung cancer was not a 
specifically listed disease under the statute, it was willing to grant 
coverage under the Amendment for diseases caused by substances 
                                                                                                             
 56. Id. 
 57. See Austin v. Travelers Ins. Co., 79 So. 2d 383 (La. Ct. App. 1955) 
(holding that toxemia from exposure to TNT dust was compensable under the 
Amendment); Bernard v. La. Wild Life & Fisheries Comm., 152 So. 2d 114 (La. 
Ct. App. 1963) (holding that employee’s injuries from exposure to a chemical 
spray were compensable under the Amendment); Riley v. Avondale Shipyards, 
305 So. 2d 742 (La. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that injuries from employee’s 
inhalation of detergent solution were compensable under the Amendment); 
Zeringue v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 271 So. 2d 613 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (holding 
that an employee’s contraction of bullous emphysema from exposure to spray 
painting products was compensable under the Amendment). 
 58. See Johnson v. Ashland Oil, 684 So. 2d 1156 (La. Ct. App. 1st 1996). In 
Rando, the Louisiana Supreme Court cited Terrance as the case stating the First 
Circuit’s interpretation of the Amendment. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 
3d 1065, 1074 (La. 2009). However, the court in Terrance relied on the reasoning 
from Johnson in its ruling. Terrance v. Dow Chem. Co., 971 So. 2d 1058 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2007). 
 59. Johnson, 684 So. 2d at 1158. 
 60. Gautreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 694 So. 2d 977, 979 (La. Ct. App. 4th 
1996). 
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not specifically listed in the statute.
61
 The court, nonetheless, ruled 
that asbestos did not meet one of the elemental-compound 
classifications under the Amendment.
62
 In addition, the 
determination regarding asbestos’ elemental makeup was made 
without any expert testimony.
63
 
The Gautreaux plurality reached its decision over a strong 
dissent. The dissenting justices held that asbestos was a covered 
substance under the elemental classifications in the Amendment.
64
 
The dissenters reasoned that the Amendment’s language allowing 
for coverage of diseases caused by oxygen and its compounds 
included all compounds containing oxygen, and since asbestos 
contains oxygen, its diseases are covered under the Amendment.
65
 
The dissent also stressed the agreement of assured compensation 
by an employer in exchange for a plaintiff’s right to a remedy in 
tort underlying workers’ compensation.66 Therefore, liberal 
coverage interpretations must be accompanied by liberal 
exclusivity clause interpretations to preserve the workers’ 
compensation system.
67
 Finally, the dissenting opinion stated that 
the legislature likely did not mean to include asbestosis while 
excluding other diseases caused by asbestos.
68
 
The second circuit in Adams v. Asbestos Corp. refused to 
follow the reasoning in Gautreaux and held mesothelioma was a 
compensable disease under the Amendment.
69
 The court in Adams 
reasoned that asbestos’ elemental composition brought it under the 
elemental-compound classifications in the Amendment.
70
 It also 
reasoned that the legislature would not intend for different 
coverage for individuals with different diseases caused by the same 
substance.
71
 Finally, the court stated that the legislature’s failure to 
include mesothelioma as a specifically listed disease under the 
Amendment was due to its lack of knowledge about mesothelioma 
at the time of the Amendment’s passage.72 
                                                                                                             
 61. Id. at 978. 
 62. Id. at 979. 
 63. Id. (Culotta, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 980 (Byrnes, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id. (noting that a junior high level student would recognize that asbestos 
was a compound containing oxygen). 
 66. Id. at 983. 
 67. Id. at 984. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Adams v. Asbestos Corp., 914 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (La. Ct. App. 2d 2005). 
 70. Id. at 1182. 
 71. Id. at 1183 
 72. Id. 
766 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72 
 
 
 
In Brunet v. Avondale Industries Inc., the fifth circuit held 
asbestos-related diseases were covered by the Amendment.
73
 The 
court reasoned that one must look to the elemental-compound 
classifications within the Amendment if a particular disease is not 
specifically listed.
74
 The majority also attacked the weak 
procedural posture of Gautreaux.
75
 The majority criticized the use 
of the Gautreaux decision as binding precedent given that its 
plurality opinion garnered support from only two judges on a five-
judge panel.
76
 Finally, the court stressed the importance of the fact 
that the legislature included asbestosis in its list of specifically 
covered diseases.
77
 The majority argued that asbestosis’ inclusion 
was likely a signal to cover all diseases caused by asbestosis’ 
causative agent, asbestos.
78
 The court stated that a liberal coverage 
interpretation would further the policy of workers’ compensation 
by relieving the economic burden of injured workers while 
diffusing the costs of doing so in the channels of commerce.
79
 
The split among the Louisiana circuit courts of appeal shows 
that the systems of workers’ compensation and asbestos tort 
recovery are inherently at odds with one another. Although 
workers’ compensation guarantees quick and modest compensation 
for injuries, asbestos plaintiffs frequently want to avoid the system 
to gain larger recovery in tort.
80
 The theoretical battle between 
workers’ compensation and asbestos tort recovery presented the 
Louisiana Supreme Court with a major question in Rando v. Anco 
Insulations Inc.
81
 The court was given the option of placing 
asbestos injury claims into a low-cost and efficient workers’ 
compensation system or shifting asbestos claims into the Louisiana 
tort system.
82
 Although the effects of the court’s decision have yet 
to be seen, Rando drastically changed asbestos litigation in 
Louisiana and set the stage for Louisiana’s asbestos litigation 
crisis. 
 
                                                                                                             
 73. Brunet v. Avondale Indus., 772 So. 2d 974, 984 (La. Ct. App. 5th 2000). 
 74. Id. at 982. 
 75. Id. at 980. 
 76. Id.  
 77. Id. at 983. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Lori J. Khan, Untangling the Insurance Fibers in Asbestos Litigation: 
Toward a National Solution to the Asbestos Injury Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REV. 195, 
228 (1993). 
 81. See Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065 (La. 2009).  
 82. Id. at 1071. 
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C. Louisiana Falters: The Rando v. Anco Insulations Decision 
In September 2005, Ray Rando, a retired pipefitter, was 
diagnosed with mesothelioma.
83
 In November of 2005, Rando 
initiated a tort suit against his former employers, alleging asbestos 
exposure during his time as a pipefitter from 1970–1972.84 As a 
result of the Louisiana Supreme Court’s holding in Austin v. Abney 
Mills Inc., the trial court applied the law in place during the time of 
Rando’s significant exposure to asbestos.85 
The trial court dismissed defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment, arguing that Rando’s disease was covered under the 
Amendment and barred by the Amendment’s exclusivity clause.86 
The court held asbestos was not a disease-causing substance and 
that mesothelioma was not an enumerated disease under the 
Amendment.
87
 After trial, the jury found in favor of Rando and 
awarded general damages of $2.8 million and $402,000 in special 
damages.
88
 
The defendants appealed the trial court’s decision, which was 
upheld by the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.
89
 The first 
circuit followed Terrance v. Dow Chemical Co., which held that 
the Amendment did not include mesothelioma as an enumerated 
disease or asbestos as a disease-causing substance.
90
 The court also 
upheld the trial court’s causation and damages determinations.91 
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs to resolve the 
circuit split over mesothelioma and asbestos coverage under the 
Amendment.
92
 The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the first 
circuit’s ruling and held that mesothelioma was not an enumerated 
disease under the Amendment.
93
 In addition, the Court held that 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.; see Austin v. Abney Mills Inc., 824 So. 2d 1137 (La. 2002) (accepting 
the significant exposure theory in Louisiana asbestos cases and requiring the 
application of the law in place at the time of an individual’s significant exposure to 
asbestos). 
 86. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1073. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 1074. 
 90. Id.; see also Terrance v. Dow Chem. Co., 971 So. 2d 1058, 1066 (La. Ct. 
App. 1st 2007), writ denied, 970 So. 2d 534 (La. 2007). 
 91. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1074. 
 92. Id.; see also supra Part I.B. (discussing the split within the Louisiana 
circuit courts of appeal over asbestos injury coverage under the Amendment). 
 93. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1079, 1094. 
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asbestos was not a disease-causing agent under the elemental-
compound classifications in the Amendment.
94
 
The Rando majority used the canons of interpretation from the 
Louisiana Civil Code to interpret the Amendment’s coverage.95 
While the majority agreed that the Amendment broadened the 
scope of workers’ compensation, it held that mesothelioma was not 
a covered disease under a clear and unambiguous interpretation.
96
 
The court argued that the language stating that “[a]n occupational 
disease shall only include those diseases hereinafter listed” barred 
coverage for mesothelioma, because mesothelioma was not 
specifically stated in the statute.
97
 The majority also reasoned that 
an interpretation including mesothelioma would have been outside 
of the legislature’s intent because mesothelioma was not 
recognized as a disease caused by asbestos exposure in 1952.
98
 The 
majority rejected the argument that asbestosis’ inclusion in the 
Amendment signaled the legislature’s intent to cover all diseases 
caused by asbestos exposure due to the limited knowledge of 
asbestos’ health effects in 1952.99 
The elemental-compound classifications in the Amendment 
provided compensation for “diseases resulting from contact with . . 
. oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, and their compounds . . . [and] metals 
other than lead and their compounds.”100 Although the majority did 
state that asbestos was an oxygen and metal compound, it rejected 
the argument that asbestos was a disease-causing substance under 
any of the elemental-compound classifications in the 
Amendment.
101
 The majority also reasoned that Louisiana’s 
adoption of a general coverage workers’ compensation statute in 
1975 limited the scope of the elemental-compound classifications 
in the Amendment.
102
 The court determined that a liberal 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. at 1080. 
 95. Id. at 1075; see LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 9 (2009) (“When a law is clear 
and unambiguous and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, the 
law shall be applied as written and no further interpretation may be made in search 
of the intent of the legislature.”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 10 (2009) (“When the 
language of the law is susceptible of different meanings, it must be interpreted as 
having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.”); LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 11 (2009) (“The words of a law must be given their generally prevailing 
meaning. Words of art and technical terms must be given their technical meaning 
when the law involves a technical matter.”). 
 96. Rando, 16 So. 3d at 1079. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 1080. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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interpretation of the elemental-compound classifications would 
compensate diseases resulting from exposure to over 90% of all 
elemental compounds known to man.
103
 The majority concluded 
that a liberal interpretation rendered language in the statute 
superfluous.
104
 
Justice Victory’s dissent attacked the majority’s holding that 
asbestos was not a disease-causing agent under the elemental-
compound classifications in the Amendment.
105
 Justice Victory 
argued that the majority’s characterization of asbestos as an 
“oxygen or metal compound” required its inclusion under the 
Amendment because the Amendment covered diseases resulting 
from oxygen and metal compounds.
106
 The dissent also reasoned 
that the remedial policy of workers’ compensation supported a 
liberal interpretation of the Amendment that includes asbestos as a 
disease causing agent.
107
 
Justice Victory also argued that the majority’s interpretation 
was not compatible with the policy behind workers’ 
compensation.
108
 He thought the majority’s interpretation limited 
the amount of covered diseases to a “fairly narrow and arbitrary 
list.”109 The dissent found that coverage of asbestosis and not 
mesothelioma established a compensation system where co-
workers exposed to the same disease-causing agent received 
different coverage due to the agent’s disease manifestation.110 The 
exclusion of certain asbestos disease manifestations was therefore 
contrary to the goal of the workers’ compensation scheme.111 
Finally, the dissent argued that the legislature’s inclusion of 
coverage limitations throughout the Amendment, such as the 
exclusion of compensation for tuberculosis, supported a liberal 
interpretation of the Amendment allowing coverage for diseases 
not specifically excluded.
112
 
The Rando decision shows that Louisiana is not immune to the 
burdens of asbestos litigation. While the Louisiana Supreme Court 
could have shifted all asbestos claims into an efficient workers’ 
compensation system, the court’s decision placed asbestos in the 
                                                                                                             
 103. Id. at 1080 n.9. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 1096 (Victory, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1099. 
 108. Id. at 1095. 
 109. Id. at 1101 n.6 (quoting Gautreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 694 So. 2d 977, 
983 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (Byrnes, J., dissenting)). 
 110. Id. at 1103. 
 111. See id. 
 112. Id. at 1103 n.7. 
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tort system, which has historically failed to adjudicate asbestos 
claims efficiently. Therefore, Louisiana must search for a solution 
to its impending asbestos litigation crisis. 
II. SEARCHING FOR A SOLUTION 
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s ruling in Rando opened the 
floodgates for asbestos litigation in Louisiana by requiring asbestos 
plaintiffs in the second and fifth circuits to seek recovery in the tort 
system.
113
 Although the Louisiana judiciary has yet to study the 
effect of the Rando decision on asbestos filings in Louisiana, the 
decision is likely to increase asbestos claims in the state. 
Therefore, Louisiana must craft a solution that adequately 
adjudicates asbestos claims while limiting litigation costs. 
Louisiana could look to other states that have enacted procedural 
mechanisms, including consolidation and medical criteria statutes, 
to efficiently resolve asbestos litigation costs. 
A. The Consolidation Solution 
Asbestos case consolidation occurs throughout the country.
114
 
In consolidation, claims are grouped together when they possess a 
common question of law or fact.
115
 The specific purpose behind 
asbestos consolidation is the quick and efficient resolution of 
asbestos cases.
116
  
In theory, consolidation has several positive effects. The 
joinder of numerous claims involving similar injuries and 
questions of fact promotes judicial efficiency by streamlining the 
discovery and liability portions of a case.
117
 Furthermore, 
consolidation gives jurisdictions facing massive amounts of 
                                                                                                             
 113. Id. at 1074. 
 114. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation and Tort Law: Trends, 
Ethics, & Solutions: Addressing the “Elephantine Mass” of Asbestos Cases: 
Consolidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case 
Management Plans That Defer Claims Filed by the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 
271, 281 (2003) (noting the practice of asbestos consolidation in Virginia and 
West Virginia); Victor E. Schwartz & Rochelle M. Tedesco, The Law of 
Unintended Consequences in Asbestos Litigation: How Efforts to Streamline the 
Litigation Have Fueled More Claims, 71 MISS. L. J. 531, 543 (2002) (noting the 
practice of asbestos consolidation in Mississippi and West Virginia). 
 115. See Gene R. Shreve, Reform Aspirations of the Complex Litigation 
Project, 54 LA. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1994). 
 116. Id. at 1141. 
 117. Schwartz, supra note 114, at 281–84 (discussing the perception that 
consolidation promotes efficiency). 
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asbestos claims a mechanism to lower the litigation costs of 
plaintiffs, defendants, and the courts.
118
 
The practical effects of consolidation, however, negate its 
theoretical positives.
119
 Modern asbestos consolidations bear little 
resemblance to the first consolidations of nearly 30 years ago. The 
first consolidations normally involved a small number of cases, 
usually around five, with very similar claims and questions of 
liability.
120
 The rise in asbestos litigation, however, expanded 
consolidations into actions with hundreds and even thousands of 
plaintiffs.
121
 In addition, large consolidations often involve 
plaintiffs with dissimilar claims and liability questions against 
dozens of unrelated defendants.
122
  
Defendants in mass consolidations face heavy discovery 
burdens that require investigations of thousands of dissimilar 
claims against multiple defendants along with massive potential 
liability costs.
123
 The risk of massive liability and high litigation 
costs often forces defendants to settle consolidated asbestos 
claims.
124
 Consolidations are now characterized as a form of 
judicial blackmail because of the increased pressure on defendants 
to settle.
125
 In addition, judges, facing hundreds to thousands of 
                                                                                                             
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearing on 
H.R. 1283 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 186, 189 (1999) 
(prepared statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr., Professor, Yale Law School), 
available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju62442.000/hju 
6242_0f.htm. 
 121. Id.; State ex rel Mobil Corp. v. Gaughan, 565 S.E. 2d 793, 794 (W. Va. 
2002) (Maynard, J., concurring) (noting that a West Virginia asbestos 
consolidation involved thousands of plaintiffs; 20 or more defendants; hundreds of 
different work sites located in a number of different states; dozens of different 
occupations and circumstances of exposure; dozens of different products with 
different formulations, applications, and warnings; several different diseases; 
numerous different claims at different stages of development; and at least nine 
different law firms, with differing interests, representing the various plaintiffs. 
Additionally, the challenged conduct spanned the better part of six decades.). 
 122. See explanatory parenthetical, supra note 121. 
 123. See Mobil Corp., 563 S.E. 2d at 421 (Maynard, J., concurring). 
 124. See, e.g., Cosey v. E.D. Bullard Co., Civ. No. 95-0069 (Miss. Cir. Ct. 
Jefferson County Sept. 16, 1998). In a mass asbestos consolidation case, the judge, 
after the trial of 12 plaintiffs, pressured defendants to settle the cases of nearly 
1700 other plaintiffs. See also Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the 
Nation’s Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency is Hurting You and Innocent 
Victims in Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247, 255 (2000). 
 125. See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and 
Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1421 (noting that although class actions and 
mass consolidations are different, both still pose the risk of creating a bargaining 
scale more favorable to plaintiffs). 
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claims, often dispense with discovery procedures for many claims 
in the spirit of judicial efficiency.
126
 
Consolidation also negatively impacts asbestos plaintiffs. Mass 
asbestos consolidations often group plaintiffs with serious asbestos 
injuries, such as mesothelioma and lung cancer, with plaintiffs 
claiming only breathing difficulty or no physical impairment at 
all.
127
 Unimpaired plaintiffs with minor or no asbestos injury other 
than exposure now account for a large number of asbestos claims 
filed throughout the country.
128
 Knowing that defendants facing 
massive liability are more likely to settle, attorneys are more 
inclined to join unimpaired plaintiffs to consolidated asbestos 
cases.
129
 Because consolidation encourages large settlements, the 
majority of asbestos recovery in consolidations is going to 
individuals without a serious asbestos injury.
130
 
Consolidation risks diverting resources away from truly injured 
claimants and into the hands of unimpaired plaintiffs. Public policy 
suggests that the tort system should be directed toward holding 
defendants who are true wrongdoers responsible and compensating 
only plaintiffs who are truly injured.
131
 The consolidation method 
fails to achieve this end and cannot be the proper solution to the 
asbestos litigation crisis. 
B. The Medical Criteria Statute Solution 
As opposed to consolidation, medical criteria statutes represent 
the strongest procedural stance against asbestos litigation costs. 
Since 2004, Ohio, Georgia, Florida, Texas, Kansas, and South 
Carolina have enacted medical criteria statutes.
132
 In addition, 
courts in other states established inactive docket programs similar 
to medical criteria statutes without statutory authorization.
133
 The 
statutes establish an inactive docket, allowing only plaintiffs with 
                                                                                                             
 126. See Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 114, at 536; see also Schwartz & 
Lober, supra note 124, at 258. 
 127. See Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 114, at 544. 
 128. Id. at 538. 
 129. See Matthew L. Cooper, Too Far or Not Far Enough?: Michigan 
Supreme Court Administrative Order 2006-6 and Its Impact on Asbestos 
Litigation in Michigan, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 407, 418 (discussing the use of 
asbestos consolidations by plaintiffs’ attorneys as leverage for mass asbestos 
settlements); see also Schwartz et al., supra note 114, at 285. 
 130. Schwartz & Tedesco, supra note 114, at 542. 
 131. Id. at 536. 
 132. Philip Zimmerly, The Answer is Blowing in Procedure: States Turn to 
Medical Criteria and Inactive Dockets to Better Facilitate Asbestos Litigation, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 771, 778 (2008). 
 133. Id. 
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serious asbestos injuries to advance through the court system.
134
 
Medical criteria statutes require plaintiffs to assert prima facie 
evidence of a serious asbestos injury to gain court access.
135
 
Claims that do not meet the prima facie evidence requirements are 
dismissed or suspended until sufficient evidence of an injury is 
presented.
136
 In addition, some states limit asbestos consolidation 
and require asbestos claims to have a significant connection to the 
jurisdiction.
137
 Medical criteria statutes and inactive docket 
programs have limited asbestos filings in particular jurisdictions, 
and New York, Texas, Mississippi, and Ohio have seen decreases 
in asbestos claims between 35 and 90%.
138
 
The success of medical criteria statutes led some scholars to 
believe that the statutes are the solution to the asbestos litigation 
crisis.
139
 Medical criteria statutes, however, are not a panacea to 
the asbestos problem for several reasons. First, medical criteria 
statutes fail to adjudicate valid asbestos injury claims through 
procedural barriers.
140
 Second, retroactive application of the 
statutes fails to preserve claims and reduce strategic behavior by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys. Finally, medical criteria statutes do not limit 
asbestos claims, but instead shift claims to other jurisdictions.
141
 
                                                                                                             
 134. See id. at 780. 
 135. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 774.204(1) (2007) (“Physical impairment of the 
exposed person, to which asbestos or silica exposure was a substantial contributing 
factor, is an essential element of an asbestos or silica claim.”); see also GA. CODE 
ANN. § 51-14-4 (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-4902(a) (2006); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2307.92 (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-135-50(A) (2007); TEX. CIV. PRAC. 
& REM. CODE ANN. § 90.003(a)(1)(B) (Vernon 2007). 
 136. Zimmerly, supra note 132, at 780. 
 137. South Carolina’s statute specifically limits asbestos case consolidation 
and case transfer within its state courts. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-135-20(A)(5) 
(2006). Georgia and Florida require plaintiffs to be domiciled in the state or suffer 
their injury due to some interaction with the state. See FLA. STAT. § 774.205 
(2007); GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-14-9(a) (2007). 
 138. Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 
524 (2009) (noting the decrease in asbestos filings in states with a medical criteria 
statute or inactive docket program). 
 139. See, e.g., Mark A. Behrens, Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets 
for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 
(2001); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts can do in the Face of the Never-ending 
Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L. J. 1 (2001).  
 140. See Jordana Mishory, Riding the Herd: Scores of South Florida Silicosis 
Cases Are in Jeopardy After Fraud Allegations in Texas Bring Tough Judicial 
Scrutiny, MIAMI DAILY BUS. REV., June 12, 2006, at 8 (noting legislators’ 
concerns that Florida’s medical criteria statute for asbestos and silicosis injuries 
establishes too stringent a pleading standard for plaintiffs). 
 141. Behrens, supra note 138, at 539–541 (noting the increase in asbestos 
claims in California, Delaware, and Illinois). 
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While the effort to compensate only serious asbestos injury 
claims is admirable, medical criteria statutes exclude plaintiffs 
with minor injuries and the potential for future injuries through 
procedural barriers.
142
 Stringent pleading standards requiring 
extensive prima facie medical evidence of a serious asbestos injury 
pose procedural difficulties for plaintiffs.
143
 At the pleading stage, 
plaintiffs must show physical impairment to which asbestos 
exposure was a significant contributing factor because claims for 
economic asbestos injuries, like medical monitoring, are barred.
144
 
Consequently, plaintiffs are now required, at the pleading stage, to 
assert prima facie medical evidence showing causation of injuries, 
with latency periods spanning several decades.
145
 The need to 
assert prima facie evidence requires plaintiffs to acquire numerous 
medical and employment records from their defendant–employers, 
a practice normally reserved for the discovery process.
146
 Because 
discovery mechanisms do not attach after a case’s placement on an 
inactive docket, the ability of plaintiffs to retrieve documents 
detailing their work history and employers’ use of asbestos is 
severely hindered.
147
 
The exclusion of plaintiffs with only a minor asbestos injury 
defeats the purpose of tort litigation. While some plaintiffs may be 
at risk of death from lung cancer and mesothelioma, others suffer 
from the increased costs associated with the need to monitor for a 
potential asbestos illness or difficulty in breathing.
148
 While minor 
asbestos injuries may not manifest into major health problems, 
asbestos exposure can result in financial injuries that impact the 
lives of victims.
149
 Furthermore, the tort system is in place to 
                                                                                                             
 142. Zimmerly, supra note 132, at 700 (explaining medical criteria statutes’ 
exclusion of minor asbestos injury claims). 
 143. Mishory, supra note 140 (noting that medical criteria statutes pose 
procedural difficulties for plaintiffs in states with notice pleading). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Randy Maniloff, An Inactive Asbestos Docket: Understanding the Risks, 
MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING, Apr. 16 2003, available at 2003 WLNR 10830999; 
MERCK, supra note 15 (noting the latency periods for asbestos injuries). 
 146. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (noting how 
the discovery and summary judgment process is used to shape the prima facie 
elements and issues of a case). 
 147. Maniloff, supra note 145. 
 148. MERCK, supra note 15, at 470 (noting the wide range of possible asbestos 
injuries). 
 149. See Bower v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 522 S.E.2d 424, 431 (W. Va. 
1999) (noting the important public health policy behind compensating individuals 
with an increased need for medical monitoring due to the tortious act of another); 
Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 312 (N.J. 1987) (noting that medical 
monitoring recovery may enable early detection of a future health problem and 
decrease the liability of future defendants). 
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compensate not only plaintiffs with serious physical injuries but 
also all plaintiffs injured by another, as well, including those only 
suffering from minor physical and economic injuries.
150
 By 
excluding claims for minor asbestos injuries, medical criteria 
statutes produce many unadjudicated claims and uncompensated 
plaintiffs.
151
  
Medical criteria statutes also pose due process concerns as a 
result of retroactivity provisions requiring plaintiffs who filed 
claims prior to a medical criteria statute’s enactment to reassert 
their claims showing prima facie medical evidence of an asbestos 
injury.
152
 Florida, Georgia, and Ohio retroactively applied medical 
criteria statutes to existing asbestos claims.
153
 Each jurisdiction’s 
retroactivity provision was challenged in the court system. While 
Ohio upheld its retroactivity provisions, courts in Florida and 
Georgia declared retroactivity unconstitutional.
154
 However, both 
interpretations present problems for states considering medical 
criteria statutes as a solution to asbestos litigation. 
First, medical criteria statutes provide an incentive for strategic 
behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys. Although legislation cannot 
completely discourage strategic behavior, medical criteria statutes 
encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to flood courts with asbestos claims 
prior to a medical criteria statute’s enactment to avoid the statute’s 
stringent pleading requirements. For states not allowing 
                                                                                                             
 150. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (“Every act whatever of man that causes 
damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened.”) (emphasis added). 
 151. See Schwartz & Lober, supra note 124, at 258 (explaining the rise in 
unimpaired asbestos plaintiffs); Queena Sook Kim, G-I Holdings' Bankruptcy 
Filing Cites Exposure in Asbestos Cases, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2001, at B12. 
 152. See Maniloff, supra note 145. 
 153. See FLA. STAT. § 774.204 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-14-1 (2010); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.92 (LexisNexis 2010). 
 154. See Wilson v. AC&S Inc., 864 N.E.2d 682 (holding that retroactive 
application of provisions in Ohio’s medical criteria statute did not burden an 
invested right and could be applied to asbestos claims filed prior to the statute’s 
enactment); but see Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Ferrante, 637 S.E.2d 659 (Ga. 
2006) (holding that provisions of Georgia’s asbestos claims statute requiring 
plaintiffs to produce evidence establishing that their exposure to asbestos was a 
substantial contributing factor to their medical conditions affected plaintiffs’ 
substantive rights and could not retroactively be applied to their claims). See also 
In re Asbestos Litigation, 933 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3rd Dist. 2006) 
(holding that Florida’s “Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act” could 
not be applied to plaintiffs suffering from nonmalignant asbestos injuries who had 
received a trial date prior to the statute’s enactment); Williams v. American 
Optical Corp., 985 So. 2d 23 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2008) (holding that that 
Florida’s “Asbestos and Silica Compensation Fairness Act” cannot be 
retroactively applied to prejudice or defeat causes of action already accrued and in 
litigation). 
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retroactivity, the result of this strategic behavior is a crippling mass 
of asbestos cases remaining on their courts’ dockets.155 States 
allowing retroactivity, however, risk destroying valid claims or 
making claims dormant for a number of years. The catch-22 
presented by retroactive application shows that simply dismissing 
claims or placing them on an inactive docket is a fatal flaw within 
medical criteria statutes because, under each approach, strategic 
behavior is encouraged or claims are impeded. This problem 
signals the need for a solution that reduces the benefits of strategic 
behavior while still preserving valid injury claims. 
Second, medical criteria statutes increase asbestos litigation in 
other jurisdictions.
156
 By excluding vast amounts of claims in some 
jurisdictions, asbestos litigation is growing in jurisdictions without 
medical criteria statutes.
157
 Traditional asbestos havens such as 
Texas and South Carolina are being replaced by jurisdictions more 
hospitable to asbestos claims, and courts in California, Delaware, 
and Illinois are experiencing a rise in nonresident asbestos 
claims.
158
 The shift in asbestos litigation has even prompted 
plaintiffs’ firms specializing in mass torts to establish offices in 
states without medical criteria statues.
159
 Even though jurisdictions 
with medical criteria statutes are experiencing a lower number of 
asbestos filings, the asbestos problem still remains. The burdens of 
asbestos litigation, however, must now be borne by fewer states 
with an even greater concentration of asbestos claims than ever 
before. Therefore, medical criteria statutes fail to curb asbestos 
                                                                                                             
 155. See Jordana Mishory, No Turning Back: Judge Rules Law that Required 
Plaintiffs to Submit Medical Histories Can’t be Applied Retroactively, MIAMI 
DAILY BUS. REV., Aug. 8, 2006, at 1 (noting the over 2,500 cases pending on the 
Miami-Dade Circuit Court’s docket prior to the passage of Florida’s medical 
criteria statute). 
 156. See discussion infra Part III. The failure of medical criteria statutes to 
impact claims at the national level supports the need for federal asbestos tort 
reform. Part III will discuss the failure of the federal government to pass such 
legislation and call for a state solution that prevents the shifting of asbestos claims 
to other jurisdictions by formulating a state-administered compensation schedule 
that adequately reduces the need for plaintiffs’ attorneys to employ strategic 
behavior and increase the asbestos litigation burden on other jurisdictions. 
 157. Behrens, supra note 138, at 539 (noting the increase in asbestos claims in 
California, Delaware, and Illinois). 
 158. Id.; see also Victor E. Schwartz et al., Litigation Tourism Hurts 
Californians, 21-20 MEALEY’S LITIG. REP. ASB. 20 (2006) (noting that in 
California over 30% of asbestos plaintiffs are nonresidents and lack any 
connection to the forum). The term “traditional asbestos haven” is used to describe 
jurisdictions that historically have been a popular forum for asbestos plaintiffs. 
 159. Cortney Fielding, Plaintiffs’ Lawyers Turn to L.A. Courts for Asbestos 
Litigation, DAILY J. (Los Angeles, Ca.), Feb. 27, 2009, at 1. 
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litigation and instead encourage forum shopping by asbestos 
plaintiffs. 
Consolidation and medical criteria statutes do not adequately 
resolve the asbestos litigation problem, and states must formulate 
new remedies to counteract asbestos’ stranglehold on the judicial 
system. These remedies should allow states to resolve asbestos 
claims efficiently without sacrificing the interests of plaintiffs, 
defendants, and other jurisdictions. One plan not yet enacted at a 
state level may provide the necessary remedy: the adoption of a 
scheduled asbestos compensation fund. 
III. THE SCHEDULED COMPENSATION SOLUTION 
The failure of medical criteria statutes and consolidation 
signals the need for a national solution. Although the federal 
government attempted to enact federal asbestos litigation reform 
with the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act (FAIR Act), 
political and business interests halted the act’s passage. Therefore, 
the Louisiana legislature must reform asbestos litigation at the state 
level. The Louisiana solution, however, must adequately balance 
the interests of all parties in asbestos litigation and address the 
criticisms that led to the FAIR Act’s failure. Louisiana can achieve 
these ends by enacting a scheduled compensation plan that 
incorporates the substantive provisions of FAIR Act under the 
procedural framework of the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act. 
A. The Failed Federal Solution 
In 1997, the United States Supreme Court called for an 
administrative solution to the “elephantine mass” of asbestos 
claims and litigation costs in the United States.
160
 In 2006, Senator 
Arlen Specter, responding to the Supreme Court’s request, 
proposed the FAIR Act to the United States Senate.
161
 The 2006 
FAIR Act, at its core, would establish an administrative 
compensation schedule providing recovery for individuals 
                                                                                                             
 160. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999) (describing 
asbestos litigation as an “elephantine mass” that defies customary judicial 
administration and requires national legislation); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 
521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (“[A] nationwide administrative claims processing 
regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating 
victims of asbestos exposure.”). 
 161. Elise Gelinas, Asbestos Fraud Should Lead to Fairness: Why Congress 
Should Enact the Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act, 69 MD. L. REV. 162, 
168 (2009) (noting Congress’ failure to enact previous versions of the FAIR Act 
and Senator Arlen Specter’s proposal of the 2006 version of the act). 
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adversely affected by asbestos.
162
 An administrative staff would 
run the compensation fund
163
 and process asbestos claims on a no-
fault basis and in a nonadversarial setting.
164
 The administrative 
staff would promulgate procedures for filing claims and establish a 
payment schedule based on a claimant’s injuries and medical 
history.
165
 The FAIR Act’s compensation model would establish a 
$140 billion compensation fund.
166
 Defendant companies, their 
insurers, and prior asbestos defendants’ bankruptcy trusts would be 
the primary financiers of the compensation fund.
167
 Recovery 
under the fund would be disbursed according to a tiered 
compensation schedule.
168
 Compensation would range from 
$25,000 for claimants requiring medical monitoring to $1.1 million 
for claimants diagnosed with mesothelioma.
169
 
Unfortunately, Congress did not enact the FAIR Act due to 
immense pressure from political and business groups.
170
 Critics 
believed that the compensation fund’s no-fault model would 
increase claims by individuals without serious asbestos injuries.
171
 
Critics also feared the rise in claims would bankrupt the 
compensation fund and require a federal bailout of the fund.
172
 
Conversely, legislators felt that the fund’s compensation levels did 
                                                                                                             
 162. Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong. 
§ 2 (2006) (“[The purpose of this Act is to] create a privately funded, publicly 
administered fund to provide the necessary resources for a fair and efficient 
system to resolve asbestos injury claims that will provide compensation for 
legitimate present and future claimants of asbestos exposure as provided in this 
Act.”). 
 163. Id. § 101 (“There is established within the Department of Labor the Office 
of Asbestos Disease Compensation, which shall be headed by an Administrator.”). 
 164. Id. § 112. 
 165. Id. § 101 (“[The Administrator shall be responsible for] promulgating 
such rules, regulations, and procedures as may be necessary and appropriate to 
implement the provisions of this Act.”). 
 166. Id. § 221. 
 167. Id. §§ 201–226 (outlining the contributors and payment methods under 
the Asbestos Injury Resolution Fund). 
 168. Id. § 233. 
 169. Stephen Labaton, Asbestos Bill is Sidelined by the Senate, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 15, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/15/politics/15 
asbestos.html?pagewanted=1&ei=5088&en=8818b422c430a43a&ex=129765960
0&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss. 
 170. Id. 
 171. 152 CONG. REC. S837, 838–39 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 2006) (statement of Sen. 
Cornyn).  
 172. Id.; see also The Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006: 
Hearing on S. 3274 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 15 (2006) 
(statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director, Council on Foreign Relations) 
(arguing that a future Congress will most likely use taxpayer dollars to bail out the 
fund instead of reducing claim values or heightening eligibility standards). 
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not properly punish defendants and their insurers.
173
 Furthermore, 
financial actuaries argued the fund failed to subrogate workers’ 
compensation claims and allowed claimants to double dip in both 
state workers’ compensation programs and the compensation 
fund.
174
 
Asbestos defendants also split on their support for the FAIR 
Act. Defendants facing massive asbestos liability, like McDermott 
International and United States Gypsum, stated that a no-fault 
compensation system allowed them to compensate claimants while 
avoiding anywhere from $600,000 to $3 billion in litigation 
costs.
175
 On the other hand, defendants with limited asbestos 
liability argued that payment obligations under compensation 
funds bail out large corporations while punishing small 
businesses.
176
 The intense backlash from political and business 
critics ultimately led to the failure of the FAIR Act on February 14, 
2006, when the Act failed to survive a budget objection in the 
Senate.
177
  
At this point, the possibility of a federal scheduled 
compensation plan looks grim. Since Senator Specter’s attempt to 
pass the landmark legislation in 2006, no legislator has proposed 
the FAIR Act again. Thus, the asbestos litigation crisis seems to 
continue without any federal solution in sight. Calls still remain for 
a scheduled compensation plan, similar to that proposed by the 
FAIR Act.
178
 Therefore, in an effort to combat federal inactivity, 
states must enact scheduled compensation. In the wake of Rando, 
Louisiana has a prime opportunity to be the proving ground for 
state-administered scheduled compensation by enacting a 
scheduled compensation plan based on the substantive principles in 
                                                                                                             
 173. Labaton, supra note 169. 
 174. See Current Issues in Asbestos Litigation, ISSUE BRIEF (Am. Acad. of 
Actuaries, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2006, at 8 (noting the Academy’s letter to 
Senators Specter and Leahy regarding the risk of double dipping by plaintiffs in 
the Fair Act’s compensation fund and workers’ compensation programs). 
 175. See Julie Creswell, Large and Small Businesses Part Ways on Asbestos 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2006. United States Gypsum’s parent company, USG, 
stated that an administrative compensation scheduled would save them roughly $3 
billion in litigation costs. McDermott International stated that a compensation 
schedule would save them roughly $600,000 in litigation costs.  
 176. Id. (noting the financial difficulties imposed on smaller corporate 
defendants A.W. Chesterton and Hopeman Brothers by the FAIR Act’s required 
payments). 
 177. Labaton, supra note 169. 
 178. See, e.g., Gelinas, supra note 161 (discussing the reasons why Congress 
should enact a scheduled compensation system); see also Christopher J. O’Malley, 
Breaking Asbestos Litigation’s Chokehold on the American Judiciary, 2008 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1101, 1123 (2008) (discussing the benefits of a scheduled 
compensation system). 
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the FAIR Act and the procedural framework of the Louisiana 
Medical Malpractice Act.
179
 
B. The Need for State Administered Scheduled Compensation  
1. A Fair Recovery System for All Parties Through Scheduled 
Compensation 
Scheduled compensation solves many of the problems 
associated with asbestos litigation while fairly balancing the 
interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and attorneys. For plaintiffs, the 
establishment of a compensation fund possesses several 
advantages. Scheduled compensation ensures timely and 
appropriate recovery for plaintiffs suffering from an asbestos 
injury in a no-fault system.
180
 In the traditional tort system, 
plaintiffs are often forced to file suit against multiple defendants to 
gain adequate recovery.
181
 The need for plaintiffs to sue multiple 
defendants to gain adequate recovery often results in difficult 
proximate cause questions for plaintiffs.
182
 These questions often 
force plaintiffs to use nontraditional tort theories, such as market 
share and alternative liability, to prove causation.
183
 Louisiana and 
                                                                                                             
 179. See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (explaining the procedural framework of 
the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act and its possible application in a Louisiana 
Scheduled Asbestos Compensation Plan). 
 180. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS LITIG., REP. OF THE 
AD HOC COMM. 33 (1991) (noting the importance of establishing timely and 
appropriate compensation for plaintiffs suffering from a legally cognizable 
asbestos injury in an administrative compensation system). 
 181. See White, supra note 33, at 368–69 (noting the need for asbestos 
plaintiffs to file suit against numerous defendants due to bankruptcies induced by 
asbestos litigation costs). 
 182. The identification problem stems from two causes. First, many asbestos 
products carry no manufacturer's label. Second, plaintiffs often are exposed to 
several different asbestos products in their workplace, resulting in causation by 
multiple defendants and an inability to recall specific manufacturers. See Jeffrey 
C. Endress & Stephen G. Sozio, Market Share Liability: A One Theory Approach 
Beyond DES, 1 DET. C.L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1983); see also Case v. Fibreboard Corp., 
743 P.2d 1062, 1066–67 (Okla. 1987) (describing how identification of an 
asbestos manufacturer is almost impossible when the materials were installed 
years before the plaintiff’s exposure). 
 183. See George v. Hous. Auth., 906 So. 2d 1282, 1287 (La. Ct. App. 2005) 
(stating that “[m]arket share liability imposes pro rata liability in the ratio of 
market share of each manufacturer of a fungible product that is so generic that the 
individual manufacturer cannot be identified. The key element enabling 
complainants to recover under the market share theory in a fungible products case 
is the shift of the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant-
manufacturers, requiring them to show that they did not manufacture the offending 
product.”); see also Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68–69 (Tex. 1989) 
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other jurisdictions, though, do not welcome market share or 
alternative liability, and many plaintiffs suffering from cognizable 
asbestos injuries are denied recovery because they cannot meet the 
causation burden.
184
  
Furthermore, the allocation of damages across multiple parties 
also poses risks for many plaintiffs. For example, many states have 
adopted comparative fault schemes that allocate a percentage of 
fault to each liable party.
185
 The rash of asbestos-related 
bankruptcies has led to a massive number of insolvent 
defendants.
186
 In addition, plaintiffs cannot always identify all the 
defendants contributing to their injury.
187
 As a result, plaintiffs’ 
damages awards may shrink significantly if a large percentage of 
liability is apportioned to an insolvent or absent defendant.
188
 
Plaintiffs’ recoveries are also significantly diminished by the 
contingency fees under their representation contracts with 
attorneys.
189
 Therefore, the traditional tort system fails plaintiffs 
due to difficult causation burdens and the diminishment of awards 
by comparative fault systems and contingency fees. 
                                                                                                             
 
(noting that “[a]lternative liability . . . relaxes the plaintiff’s burden of identifying 
the actual tortfeasor and thus may allow the plaintiff to prevail when the traditional 
rules of causation would prevent recovery. When independent acts of negligence 
are simultaneously committed by two or more tortfeasors and only one act results 
in injury, the plaintiff is relieved of his burden of proof. The burden shifts to the 
defendants to exculpate themselves.”). 
 184. See George, 906 So. 2d at 1287 (noting that no Louisiana court has ever 
endorsed the market share liability theory); see also Quick v. Murphy Oil Co., 643 
So. 2d 1291, 1294 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (noting the United States Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeal’s rejection of alternative liability and Louisiana’s endorsement of 
traditional tort theories). 
 185. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
411.182 (LexisNexis 2010); FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (Westlaw 2011) (establishing a 
pure comparative fault standard allocating a percentage of fault to each liable 
party); but see GA. CODE. ANN. § 51-11-7 ( Westlaw 2011); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 
13 (Westlaw 2011) (establishing a comparative fault standard barring recovery to 
plaintiffs who could have avoided the consequences of a defendant’s negligence 
by exercising reasonable care).  
 186. See Plevin, Where are They Now?, supra note 35. 
 187. Id. 
 188. For a further discussion of insolvent and absent defendants in comparative 
fault cases, see Gerald W. Boston, Apportionment of Harm in Tort Law: A 
Proposed Restatement, 21 DAYTON L. REV. 267 (1996); Steven B. Hantler et al., 
Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 46 (2005). 
 189. See Lester Brickman, Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 33 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 833, 841–842 (2005) (noting that plaintiffs’ lawyers charge contingency 
fees in asbestos litigation ranging from 25% to 50%, with a plurality of 
contingency fees charged at 40%). 
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The principles of nonadversarial and administrative 
adjudication of asbestos claims in the FAIR Act eliminate 
causation and damages concerns for plaintiffs. Because plaintiffs 
only need to show a cognizable asbestos injury, plaintiffs are not 
forced to use nontraditional tort theories such as market share or 
alternative liability.
190
 Furthermore, the establishment of a single 
solvent compensation fund eliminates the need to assert numerous 
claims against multiple defendants. Without the risk of an 
insolvent or absentee defendant, plaintiffs’ recovery will not be 
diminished in states with a comparative fault regime. Therefore, 
scheduled compensation limits the causation burden for plaintiffs 
while ensuring adequate recovery. 
In order to counteract the massive contingency fees charged by 
plaintiffs’ attorneys, scheduled compensation funds must cap 
attorneys’ fees. Fee caps, however, must be weighed against the 
costs and potential losses attorneys may incur by having to 
adjudicate claims in an administrative scheme. By providing fees 
weighed against attorney costs, a scheduled compensation plan can 
reduce the incentive for strategic behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys 
and prevent attorneys from shifting Louisiana asbestos claimants 
into jurisdictions without fee caps. As a result, scheduled 
compensation, unlike medical criteria statutes, discourages 
strategic behavior by plaintiffs’ attorneys filing asbestos claims. 
Asbestos defendants and their insurers also benefit from 
scheduled compensation. Defendants have paid tens of billions of 
dollars for defense counsel in asbestos litigation,
191
 and asbestos 
litigation costs will eventually total $265 billion.
192
 Scheduled 
compensation, however, provides several remedies to lower this 
cost. Scheduled compensation funds establish the required 
contribution amounts from defendants, their insurers, and asbestos 
defendant bankruptcy trusts.
193
 Furthermore, scheduled 
compensation allows defendants to pay contributions over a number 
of years to ensure defendants’ economic viability.194 Therefore, 
defendants can accurately project their asbestos liability and manage 
economic resources in a way that ensures financial solvency. Most 
importantly, scheduled compensation operates in a nonadversarial 
setting and eliminates the need for asbestos defense counsel,
195
 
                                                                                                             
 190. Fairness in Asbestos Injury Resolution Act of 2006, S. 3274, 109th Cong. 
§§ 111–115 (2006). 
 191. White, Future of Mass Torts, supra note 28, at 192. 
 192. CAROLL ET AL., supra note 28, at vii. 
 193. FAIR Act, S. 3274, §§ 201–226 (2006). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. § 101. 
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which substantially limits litigation costs for asbestos defendants.
196
 
By lowering the litigation costs of asbestos defendants and their 
insurers, scheduled compensation decreases the risk of insolvency 
that many asbestos defendants currently face. 
2. Addressing the Criticisms of the FAIR Act 
Although scheduled compensation plans possess many 
benefits, political and business interests derailed scheduled 
compensation at the federal level.
197
 Because medical criteria 
statutes and consolidation fail to resolve asbestos claims 
adequately,
198
 state-administered scheduled compensation presents 
the best solution to the asbestos crisis. State-administrated 
scheduled compensation, however, must adequately address the 
concerns with the FAIR Act. By adopting scheduled compensation 
plans that address the criticisms of the FAIR act, states can 
formulate a proper solution to the asbestos crisis. 
The risk that a mass influx of asbestos claim would bankrupt a 
federal compensation fund was a major criticism of the FAIR 
Act.
199
 State-administered scheduled compensation, however, can 
alleviate this criticism through several measures. Although 
scheduled compensation on a national level cannot turn away 
claimants based on jurisdictional connection, states enacting 
scheduled compensation can establish jurisdictional barriers, such 
as requiring a claimant to have been exposed to asbestos within a 
jurisdiction’s boundaries.200 By establishing jurisdictional barriers, 
a state compensation fund can eliminate claims for minor asbestos 
injuries that have no significant connection to the state. In addition, 
states must require plaintiffs to produce prima facie medical 
evidence in order to recover compensation. Unlike the prima facie 
requirements imposed by medical criteria statutes, which exclude 
minor asbestos injuries, states can establish guidelines for asserting 
minor asbestos injury claims such as asbestos exposure requiring 
                                                                                                             
 196. See Creswell, supra note 175 (noting the decrease in litigation costs for 
asbestos defendants under an administrative compensation schedule). 
 197. See supra Part III.A (discussing the FAIR Act and its failure due to 
political and business criticisms). 
 198. See supra Part II (discussing the inadequacy of consolidation and medical 
criteria statutes in solving the asbestos litigation crisis). 
 199. Creswell, supra note 175. 
 200. Although medical criteria statutes ultimately do not properly adjudicate 
asbestos claims for other reasons, the provisions within them establishing 
jurisdictional barriers should be included within a state administered scheduled 
compensation plan. For an example of jurisdictional barriers enacted under 
medical criteria statutes, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 774.205 (Westlaw 2011); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 51-14-9(a) (Westlaw 2011). 
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medical monitoring and difficulty in breathing. By establishing 
guidelines for minor asbestos injuries, as opposed to simply 
excluding such claims, states can weed out meritless claims while 
still providing recovery for minor and major asbestos injuries. The 
inclusion of minor asbestos injury claims in a compensation 
schedule also reduces the need for plaintiffs to migrate claims to 
other jurisdictions. Through significant exposure and medical 
evidence requirements, states can limit meritless claims and ensure 
their compensation fund’s solvency. 
The effect of scheduled compensation on workers’ 
compensation covering asbestos injuries is another major concern. 
Critics of the FAIR Act claimed that a federal compensation fund 
encouraged plaintiffs to double dip into both the fund and workers’ 
compensation systems, which allows workers’ compensation 
coverage for asbestos injuries.
201
 This concern is important after 
Rando because the Louisiana Supreme Court allowed recovery in 
only workers’ compensation for individuals stricken with 
asbestosis.
202
 Workers’ compensation systems, however, are 
generally administered at the state level.
203
 Therefore, while the 
FAIR Act did not prevent double dipping in state workers’ 
compensation schemes, state legislatures can certainly prevent 
double dipping between a state’s workers’ compensation system 
and compensation fund. 
States can prevent double dipping by enacting exclusivity 
clauses similar to the clauses found in most workers’ compensation 
statutes. By mirroring the exclusivity clauses found in workers’ 
compensation statutes, state legislatures can enact exclusivity 
clauses barring recovery from the compensation fund when a 
claimant has already recovered under a state’s workers’ 
compensation scheme.
204
 In addition, exclusivity clauses should 
                                                                                                             
 201. See Current Issues in Asbestos Litigation, ISSUE BRIEF (Am. Acad. of 
Actuaries, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2006, at 8 (noting the Academy’s letter to 
Senators Specter and Leahy regarding the risk of double dipping by plaintiffs in 
the Fair Act’s compensation fund and workers’ compensation programs). 
 202. See Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1080 (La. 2009) 
(noting that the 1952 Occupation Disease Amendment only provided recovery for 
injuries related to asbestosis). 
 203. See Henry H. Drummonds, The Sister Sovereign States: Preemption and 
the Second Twentieth Century Revolution in the Law of the American Workplace, 
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 469, 493 (1993) (noting that workers’ compensation for 
most Americans is a state law and explaining the traditional role of workers’ 
compensation at the state level); see also Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 
U.S. 504, 524 (1981) (noting that workers’ compensation rewards are subject to 
the state’s police power). 
 204. For an example of an exclusivity clause under worker’s compensation, see 
LA. REV. STAT. § 23:1032 (2010). 
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bar recovery in workers’ compensation for claims adjudicated 
under a scheduled compensation plan. Because states can exert 
control over their workers’ compensation system and asbestos 
compensation fund, state-administered scheduled compensation 
can adequately address the workers’ compensation concerns of the 
FAIR Act’s critics. 
Most importantly, scheduled compensation, unlike medical 
criteria statutes, promotes self-sufficiency in adjudicating asbestos 
claims. While medical criteria statutes do not adjudicate the 
majority of asbestos cases,
205
 scheduled compensation quickly 
determines the merits of all claims and grants the necessary 
compensation for claims showing a cognizable asbestos injury.
206
 
By providing an efficient means of adjudicating minor and major 
asbestos injuries within a jurisdiction, scheduled compensation 
reduces the need for plaintiffs to seek out other jurisdictions to 
adjudicate their claims. Therefore, state-administered scheduled 
compensation actually reduces asbestos litigation as opposed to 
shifting asbestos litigation into other jurisdictions. Thus, scheduled 
compensation not only efficiently solves jurisdictions’ asbestos 
litigation problems, but it also achieves this end without sacrificing 
the judicial efficiency of other states. 
The massive amount of claims currently pending in the court 
system, as well as a possible rash of claims prior to a scheduled 
compensation plan’s enactment, require compensation plans to 
achieve two necessary ends. First, scheduled compensation plans 
must subrogate previously filed claims into scheduled 
compensation. Second, jurisdictions must establish scheduled 
compensation as the sole remedy for all future asbestos injury 
claims. One method that can achieve these ends is to retroactively 
apply a scheduled compensation plan to previously filed claims. 
Unfortunately, states with medical criteria statutes have held 
retroactivity unconstitutional.
207
 This does not mean, however, that 
retroactivity clauses cannot work in a scheduled compensation 
system. In decisions that overturned retroactivity provisions in 
medical criteria statutes, courts in Georgia and Florida specifically 
addressed cases where a lack of prima facie evidence under the 
medical criteria statute retroactively dismissed or shifted asbestos 
                                                                                                             
 205. See supra Part II.B (discussing the inability of medical criteria statutes to 
adequately adjudicate claims). 
 206. The term “cognizable asbestos injury” includes not only physical asbestos 
injuries such as mesothelioma and asbestosis but also economic asbestos injuries 
such as medical costs requiring medical monitoring damages. 
 207. See supra note 154 (outlining the decisions of courts in Florida, Georgia, 
and Ohio on the retroactive application of medical criteria statutes). 
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claims onto an inactive docket.
208
 Retroactivity clauses in a 
scheduled compensation plan, however, do not retroactively 
dismiss or impede a claim’s adjudication. Instead, retroactivity 
preserves and shifts claims into an administrative adjudication 
scheme. Therefore, courts may not strike down retroactivity, 
because scheduled compensation gives plaintiffs a lower burden of 
proof and does not retroactively dismiss claims for minor asbestos 
injuries. Furthermore, if courts do strike down retroactive 
application, legislation making scheduled compensation the sole 
remedy for all future asbestos injury claims still offers a proper 
solution for future asbestos litigation in a jurisdiction. When 
combined with legislation making scheduled compensation the 
sole remedy for asbestos injuries, retroactivity clauses adequately 
shift pending and future claims into the compensation schedule.  
While retroactivity concerns pose difficulties for scheduled 
compensation, Louisiana law likely enables the retroactive 
application of a scheduled compensation plan. The Louisiana Civil 
Code addresses the retroactive application of procedural and 
substantive laws.
209
 The Civil Code retroactively applies 
procedural laws while allowing retroactive application of 
substantive laws when intended by the legislature.
210
 Scheduled 
compensation makes procedural and substantive changes to 
asbestos recovery. As a result, scheduled compensation can apply 
retroactively, provided that the Louisiana legislature establishes a 
clear intent to retroactively apply the substantive portions of a 
scheduled compensation plan. 
3. The Louisiana Scheduled Asbestos Compensation Plan 
The final hurdle for state administered scheduled compensation 
is the establishment of the compensation fund and its procedural 
framework. Although the idea of a state administered 
compensation fund may seem foreign to many, states already 
administer compensation plans in other litigation arenas. For 
example, the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act establishes a 
statutory recovery cap with payment through a Patients’ 
Compensation Fund.
211
 The Medical Malpractice Act also provides 
                                                                                                             
 208. Id. 
 209. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 6 (2010) (“In the absence of contrary 
legislative expression, substantive laws apply prospectively only. Procedural and 
interpretative laws apply both prospectively and retroactively, unless there is a 
legislative expression to the contrary.”). 
 210. See supra note 154. 
 211. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44 (2010) (establishing a Patient’s 
Compensation Fund for victims of medical malpractice in Louisiana). 
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guidelines for collecting contributions to the fund and establishes 
procedural mechanisms for resolving medical malpractice suits.
212
 
Under the statute, plaintiffs’ claims are first adjudicated by a 
medical review panel.
213
 The medical review panel’s determination 
is not a final adjudication, and plaintiffs may file an action in the 
court system after the review panel renders its decision.
214
 The 
medical review panel’s decision is not binding on the trial court, 
but it is submitted to the trial court as expert testimony.
215
 
The Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act provides a sound 
procedural framework for a state-administered asbestos scheduled 
compensation plan. Of course, the framework provided by the 
Medical Malpractice Act must be slightly modified to achieve the 
goals of scheduled compensation. Like the Medical Malpractice 
Act, Louisiana’s scheduled compensation system should adjudicate 
all asbestos claims through an administrative asbestos review 
panel. In an asbestos review panel, claimants will need to assert 
only prima facie medical evidence of a legally cognizable asbestos 
injury.
216
 However, the asbestos review panel, unlike medical 
review panels, will operate in a nonadversarial setting, and its 
determination will be binding upon claimants.
217
 Because the 
Louisiana Constitution provides the right to an appeal for all 
decisions affecting the rights and property of individuals, asbestos 
review panel decisions should be appealable to a state court.
218
 The 
                                                                                                             
 212. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.44(A)(5) (2010) (establishing procedures 
for collecting funds from contributors to the Patient’s Compensation Fund). 
 213. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.47 (2010). Medical Review Panels are 
the first step in the adjudication of a medical malpractice action in Louisiana. 
Malpractice claims must first go through the medical review panel, and claims 
filed in court prior to a determination by the medical review panel are dismissed as 
untimely. The Medical Review Panels consist of three healthcare professionals 
and are chaired by a nonvoting attorney member. Id. 
 214. Id.  
 215. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.47(H) (2010) (“Any report of the expert 
opinion reached by the medical review panel shall be admissible as evidence in 
any action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of law, but such expert 
opinion shall not be conclusive[.]”). 
 216. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.1299.47 (2010). In medical review panels, 
plaintiffs are required to prove (1) the standard of care of their treating physician, 
(2) a breach of the standard of care, and (3) causation between the breach and the 
plaintiff’s injury. Under a Louisiana scheduled compensation plan, a legally 
cognizable asbestos injury would include all physical and economic injuries 
caused by asbestos exposure. 
 217. Id. Medical Review Panels are adversarial in nature, and plaintiffs and 
defendants present evidence regarding the standard of care and breach of that 
standard by the healthcare physician. 
 218. LA. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
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panel’s decisions, however, should be given deference by the 
appellate court in order to limit the number of appeals filed. 
While the Medical Malpractice Act provides a sound 
procedural framework for a Louisiana scheduled compensation 
system, the FAIR Act provides the necessary substantive basis for 
a Louisiana system through its nonadversarial and no-fault method. 
By combining the procedural framework of the Medical 
Malpractice Act with the substantive provisions of the FAIR Act, 
Louisiana can establish a fair scheduled compensation system that 
adequately compensates plaintiffs while limiting the litigation 
costs of asbestos defendants and the state. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The impending consequences of the Rando decision require 
legislative action. The combination of the federal government’s 
failure to enact asbestos litigation reform and the negative impacts 
of other jurisdictions’ solutions leaves the responsibility of 
combating asbestos litigation squarely on the shoulders of the 
Louisiana legislature. This problem provides Louisiana the 
opportunity to be at the forefront of combating asbestos litigation 
at the state level. Louisiana and other states must answer this call 
by enacting a scheduled compensation system that adopts the 
suggestions provided in this Comment to efficiently adjudicate 
asbestos claims. Louisiana has the opportunity to create a 
scheduled compensation model that is fair to plaintiffs, defendants, 
attorneys, and the court system. Therefore, the Louisiana 
legislature must enact a scheduled compensation plan to combat 
asbestos litigation’s stranglehold on the judicial system. 
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